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Abstract 
This paper compares the average productivity of migrants (who work in a country different from their 
country of origin) and stayers (whose entire academic career takes place in their country of origin) in a set of 
2,530 highly productive economists that work in 2007 in a selection of the top 81 Economics departments 
worldwide. The main findings are the following two. Firstly, productivity comparisons between migrants 
and stayers depend on the cohort and the type of department where individuals work in 2007. For example, 
in the top U.S. departments, foreigners are more productive than stayers only among older individuals; in 
the bottom U.S. departments, foreigners are more productive than stayers for both cohorts, while in the 
other countries with at least one department in the sample the productivity of foreigners and stayers is 
indistinguishable for both cohorts. Secondly, when we restrict our attention to an elite consisting of 
economists with above average productivity, all productivity differences between migrants and stayers in the 
U.S. vanish. These results are very robust. However, our ability to interpret these correlations is severely 
limited by the absence of information on the decision to migrate. 
Acknowledgements. This manuscript is based on the second version of a Working Paper under the title 
“The effect of spatial mobility in scientific productivity. Some evidence from a set of highly productive 
economists” published in this series under the number 14-15 in September 2015. Albarrán acknowledges 
financial support from the Spanish MEC through grants ECO2009-11165 and ECO2011-29751, and 
Carrasco and Ruiz-Castillo through grants No. ECO2012-31358 and ECO2014-55953-P, respectively, as 
well as grant MDM 2014-0431 to their Departamento de Economía. Conversations with Jesús Fernández-





In all sciences, researchers originate from many countries. However, when we focus on the most 
productive and influential researchers we observe that a large contingent of scientists working in the top 
U.S. research institutions have obtained their first college degree in their country of origin.1 Understandably, 
this situation can be described as a case of what Hunter et al. (2009) calls the elite brain drain –a worrisome 
phenomenon from the point of view of the sending countries. However, there is a second group of 
scientists who study and/or work abroad followed by a return to the home country –a phenomenon known 
as brain circulation. Such people return home with the human capital they would have not acquired if it were 
not for the possibility of temporary emigration.2 Therefore, it is convenient to partition scientists born in 
any country into three groups: brain drain, brain circulation –which will be referred to as movers– and stayers, 
who are those who study and work in their country of origin.  
This paper studies movers and stayers in a set of 2,530 highly productive economists that work in 
2007 in the top 81 Economics departments worldwide according to the Econphd (2004) ranking. Not 
surprisingly, 52 out of the 81 departments in our sample are located in the U.S. There are only eleven 
countries with at least one of the remaining 29 non-U.S. departments in the sample. We refer to them as the 
Other Sample Countries (OSC hereafter). We measure individual productivity in terms of a quality index 
that weights the number of publications from the beginning of everyone’s career up to 2007 in four 
equivalent journal classes. We use different weighting schemes leading to different productivity measures. 
Individual productivity in all scientific fields is known to be highly skewed (see Ruiz-Castillo & Costas, 
2015). This is also the case for all productivity measures used in this paper.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See inter alia Ioannidis (2004), Bauwens et al. (2008), and Panaretos & Malesios (2012). For a detailed analysis of the 
characteristics of highly productive researchers in economics, see our companion paper Albarrán et al. (2014a). 
2 For the economics of immigration, see Borjas (1999) and Stark (2005), and for a survey of four decades of economics research 
on the brain drain, see Doquier & Rapoport (2012). Specifically, for the elite brain drain, see Zuckerman (1977), Stephan & Levin 
(2001), Weinberger & Galeson (2005), Laudel (2003, 2005), and the references in note 1. For brain circulation, see inter alia Borjas  
& Bratsberg, 1996, Grogger & Hanson, 2013, and Kahn & MacGarvie, 2016. 
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In this scenario, our main aim is to study whether the productivity of foreigners is greater or not than 
the productivity of stayers both in the U.S. and the OSC.3 This is an interesting question for several reasons. 
Firstly, as we have said, brain drain is an important phenomenon in all sciences. In our dataset, the 
proportion of migrants working in 2007 in the U.S. or the OSC is 41.1% and 38.5%, respectively. For the 
understanding of the academic sector, we would like to know whether migrants are more productive than 
stayers. Secondly, this question is relevant for the design of immigration/emigration policies. For example, 
from a world welfare point of view, if it were the case that migrants are generally more productive than 
stayers, then there are reasons to defend the validity of policies aimed at facilitating increased brain 
exchange across countries (Franzoni et al., 2014). Naturally, as we will see in the discussion section, this is 
not the only point of view to be considered.  
As is well known, the unobservable ability of individuals is correlated both to migration and to 
performance. But our productivity comparisons are obtained with retrospective data concerning 
economists’ mobility and aggregate productivity up to 2007. Thus, in the absence of information for 
correcting the typical positive selection into migration among the high skilled, the endogeneity of 
individuals’ locational choice makes a causal interpretation of our results impossible. In this situation, we are 
restricted to searching for robust correlations capturing some new stylized facts worth investigating further 
in economics and other scientific disciplines. With this purpose in mind, the following three considerations 
guide our empirical strategy. 
1. Our measure of aggregate productivity up to 2007 favors older people. Therefore, it is essential to 
control for experience or (academic) age effects. In addition, we study cohort effects for different 
definitions of the distinction between young and older individuals. Demographic variables –age, cohort, and 
gender effects– account for a large proportion of the variance of individual productivity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In Albarrán et al. (2014b), we also study a different question from the perspective of the sending countries: are movers –brain 
drain and brain circulation– from the OSC (or the U.S.) more productive than OSC (or U.S.) stayers? 
4 
 
2. We observe the existence of department effects in the U.S., in the sense that when we partition the 52 
U.S. departments into several categories according to their prestige –say, top, intermediate, and bottom 
categories–, the average productivity of economists working in each category is hierarchically ordered. A 
proper interpretation of this result requires discussing whether higher performing universities contribute to 
the productivity of individual researchers and/or whether they simply attract more productive individuals. 
As already noted, our data does not allow us to address this question. However, the literature concerning 
the inexistence of geographically based spillover effects (Han Kim et al., 2009, Azoulay et al., 2010, 
Waldinger, 2012, Borjas & Doran, 2014, and Dubois et al., 2014) leads us to suggest that department effects 
are essentially due to self-selection on the supply side, and the role of meritocratic criteria on the demand 
side of a highly competitive market. Be that as it may, a key lesson for our purposes is that productivity 
comparisons between foreigners and stayers in the U.S. must be made conditional on such department 
effects.  
Our preferred specification consists of the double partition of departments into three categories –top 
U.S. departments, bottom U.S. departments, and OSC departments– and individuals into two cohorts of 
young and older people. In this specification we make six productivity comparisons between foreigners and 
stayers. In all cases, we control for a relatively rich set of career variables, namely, the university where each 
individual earns her B.A., her Ph.D., and the university where each holds her first job.   
3. The results in the literature concerning the existence of productivity differences between migrants 
and nationals in the U.S. academic sector are mixed. Independently of the fact that different studies use 
different methodologies, as well as different productivity measures for scientists in different fields during 
different time periods, there are also important differences in the characteristics of the group to whom 
migrants are compared. For example, Hunter et al. (2009) study a small sample of 138 highly cited 
researchers writing in physics journals between 1981 and 1999. Using a simple formal model, their main 
conclusion is that, due to low mobility costs, the distribution of talent can be expected to be similar across 
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different countries, so that foreigners who move to the U.S. go on to be neither more nor less distinguished 
than American-born elite physicists. This contradicts the results from two important contributions whose 
datasets consist of more than 2,500 Ph.D. economists working in the U.S. (McDowell & Singell, 2000), or 
more than 14,000 retrospective questionnaires in several sciences (Franzoni et al., 2014). Both studies find 
that, after controlling for the endogeneity of the migration decision, migrant scientists exhibit superior 
performance.4  
Given any ordered individual productivity distribution, consider the possibility of restricting the 
attention to some subset of researchers in the upper tail of the distribution. We refer to such subset as the 
elite. In this paper, we establish that when we make such a move in the Hunter et al. (2009) model the 
productivity of elite migrants converges to the productivity of elite stayers. In view of the disparity of results 
for samples of very different nature in the literature, and in view of our extension of the Hunter et al. (2009) 
model, we find it interesting to make all of our productivity comparisons for the entire population 
consisting of 2,530 economists, and an elite consisting of 833 individuals with above average productivity. 
Furthermore, given the high skewness of individual productivity, restricting attention to what happens at the 
upper tail of the distribution is an interesting research option. Our main results are the following. 
• In the top 25 U.S. departments, the productivity of foreigners in the total sample is greater than the 
productivity of stayers only among the older individuals. Among the young, the productivity of the two 
groups is indistinguishable.  
• In the bottom 27 U.S. departments the situation is very different. The key feature is the very low 
productivity of both young and older stayers in the total sample. Thus, migrants are more productive than 
stayers in both cohorts in this sample.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The same conclusion is reached by Ruhose et al. (2015) for 565 high-skilled German immigrants versus 289,538 high-skilled U.S. 
natives. However, rather than Ph.D. holders working in the U.S. academic sector, the high-skilled in this paper are individuals 
with a B.A. or higher degree who work in any type of full-time job in the U.S. 
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• In agreement with our extension of the Hunter et al. (2009) model, all productivity differences 
between foreigners and stayers in the U.S. vanish in the elite. 
• In the OSC departments, the productivity of foreigners and stayers in the two cohorts is 
indistinguishable both in the total sample and the elite. 
A remarkable aspect of these findings is that they are robust in the following four directions: (i) the 
partition of the 81 departments into three or more categories, (ii) the treatment of the elite, (iii) the 
definition of the two cohorts, and (iv) the weighting scheme used in the construction of the productivity 
measure.  
The rest of the paper consists of four Sections and two Appendices. Section II presents the data, as 
well as some descriptive statistics. Section III describes the sequence of estimates leading to our preferred 
specification, and presents the key empirical results comparing the productivity of migrants and stayers in 
the total sample and the elite controlling for demographics and career variables. Section IV studies the 
robustness of the results. Section V includes a summary of the paper, a discussion of the main findings, 
some policy considerations, and some concluding comments on further research. Appendix I includes some 
statistical material, and Appendix II discusses the Hunter et al. (2009) model. 
II. DATA, THE MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE ELITE NOTION 
 
 II.1. The data  
In this Sub-section, we briefly describe a dataset that was originally constructed to study the elite in 
economics (Albarrán et al., 2014a). In the first place, we select faculty members in the top 81 departments 
worldwide according to the Econphd (2004) university ranking. This ranking takes into account the 
publications in the period 1993-2003 in the top 63 Economics journals in the Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) 
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weighted journal ranking, where the weights reflect journal citation counts adjusted for factors such as the 
annual number of pages and the age of the journal (for further methodological details, see Econphd, 2004).5  
Searching in the 81 departmental web pages in 2007, we found a total of 2,705 economists with the 
minimum information we require for each individual: nationality, university where a Ph.D. is obtained, age, 
and publications in the periodical literature up to 2007. The information concerning the country of birth is 
seldom available. Therefore, we assign the nationality in terms of the country where each individual obtains 
a B.A. or an equivalent first college degree.6 Similarly, since an individual’s age is not generally available we 
use the academic age, namely, the number of years elapsed since earning a Ph.D. (or equivalent degree) up 
to 2007.    
II.2. The measurement of individual productivity 
 We take information available in Internet (personal web pages, RePEc, Publish or Perish, etc.) on 
publications up to 2007 of these 2,705 people. Because of budgetary restrictions, our information on 
productivity suffers from two limitations. Firstly, the article count in our dataset made no distinction 
between single and multiple-authorship. Consequently, no correction for co-authorship could be 
implemented. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the average number of authors per article in Economics 
& Business in 2003-2011 is 1.8, whereas the mean and standard deviation for 30 broad scientific disciplines 
is 3.1 and 1.1 (Ruiz-Castillo & Costas, 2014, Table III, Appendix B). Therefore, under the assumption that 
the assignment of equal responsibility for co-authored publications is a more acceptable assumption when 
the number of authors per publication is small, our practice of assigning full credit for all publications to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We have compared this list with the first 81 economics departments listed in three other equally acceptable university rankings. 
The main conclusion is that, apart from differences in the order in which each institution appears in the various rankings, our list 
has between 70 and 73 departments in common with each of the three other lists (see Albarrán et al., 2014a for further details). 
On the other hand, the Econphd (2004) department ranking is also used in Oyer (2006). 
6 Consider the case of a foreigner earning her B.A. in a U.S. institution who works in the U.S. in 2007. She will be classified as a 
U.S. stayer. Quite apart from the fact that we do not have the means to learn about her true nationality, in so far as this person 
does not consume national resources in her college education, there are reasons to classify her as a U.S. stayer. 
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each author, independently of whether they are co-authored or not, is a lesser problem in our case. 
Secondly, although we know the journal where each article is published, it was impossible to search for the 
citation impact achieved by every article. Therefore, we are constrained to measuring individual productivity 
as a function of the total number of publications per person over her academic career up to 2007.  
In every science, there is broad agreement about the different merit associated to publishing in a 
reduced number of top journals, a larger set of excellent field journals, or the remaining international or 
local journals. Although any specific classification will always be controversial, a consensus on how to 
weight the different journal classes in order to reach a scalar measure of productivity is possibly even harder 
to reach. 
Starting from the top 63 journals in the Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) journal ranking, and taking also into 
account the rankings in Lubrano et al. (2003), and Kodrzycki & Yu (2006), in this paper we distinguish 
between four journal classes.7 In our preferred weighting scheme, the four classes are assigned weights equal 
to 40, 15, 7, and 1 point, respectively. The resulting quality index is denoted by Q . Being aware that this 
option might be objected to for being too elitist, we study the robustness of our findings using two other 
productivity indices. The first one, denoted by Q’ , assigns weights equal to 20, 10, 5, and 1 point to the four 
classes. The last index, denoted by P , weights equally all classes, i.e. it measures individual productivity as 
the total number of publications. Table A in Appendix I includes the listing of the 81 departments, together 
with information for each institution concerning the number of faculty members (including Emeritus 
Professors), the number of people without publications, the remaining scholars’ publications in classes A to 
D, and the department value of indices Q , Q’ , and P . The OSC consist of eight European countries (UK, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Classes A, B, and C consist of 5, 34, and 47 journals, while class D consists of any other journal. Class A includes the American 
Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Review of Economic Studies. By way of 
example, the following 12 journals are in class B: Economic Journal, Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Journal 
of Econometrics, Journal of Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Finance, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Rand Journal of Economics, and Review of Economics and Statistics. See Albarrán et al. (2014a) for 
further details concerning this construction. 
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the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark), and three non-European 
countries (Canada, Israel, and China). 
II.3. The total sample versus the elite 
Out of the 2,705 economists in our dataset, there are 175 faculty members without any publications at 
all (typically because they are on tenure track). In line with the previous literature on individual productivity, 
in the sequel we focus on what we call the total sample consisting of the 2,530 faculty members with at least 
one publication. 
For reasons that will be apparent in a moment, consider the partition of productivity distributions in 
the total sample into three categories according to the following scheme. Let µ1 be the mean of any 
productivity distribution, and let µ2 be the mean productivity of individuals with productivity greater than 
µ1. The three categories consist of individuals with productivity (i) less than or equal to µ1, (ii) between µ1 
and µ2, and (iii) above µ2. The information concerning the two means, the proportion of people in the three 
categories, as well as the proportion of the total productivity accounted for by each category is in Table 1. 
Table 1 around here 
The following two characteristics of productivity distributions are worth noting. Consider index Q. 
Firstly, the 2,530 individuals in the total sample are very productive: average productivity is 307.3 quality 
points per capita, equivalent to more than seven articles of class A or about 20 articles of class B. 
Alternatively, the average quality index is 16.1 per year during an academic life (the period from the first year 
after receiving a Ph.D. up to 2007), a quantity that can be compared with the 15 points assigned to one 
article in class B. Secondly, the distribution of individual productivity is highly skewed: the average 
productivity is 17 percentage points above the median, and the top 11.5% in category 3 account for 43.6% 
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of all quality points.8 In this context, we find it useful to define the elite as consisting of the 833 individuals 
with above average productivity in categories 2 and 3. 
Note that the characteristics of productivity distributions Q’ and P are very similar to the 
characteristics of distribution Q. In particular, the mean productivity of Q’ is equivalent to more than nine 
articles in class A, whereas the mean productivity of P is equal to 27 publications. On the other hand, we 
define the elite notion for distributions Q’ and P as we did for distribution Q. Since the two new 
distributions exhibit essentially the same skewness as distribution Q, the corresponding elites are of the 
same order of magnitude as before: 843 for index Q’, and 835 for index P. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
III.1. Specification issues in the total sample 
In this Sub-section, we introduce our preferred specification for the total sample when individual 
productivity is measured by the Q index. Given the high skewness of the individual productivity 
distribution, the dependent variable in the sequel is always the log of the Q index. 
We proceed in three steps. Firstly, we analyze the important role of demographic variables (age and 
gender). Secondly, we focus attention on the comparison of the productivity of foreigners and stayers in the 
U.S. and the OSC, controlling for two types of variables: department effects in the U.S., and a number of 
other career variables, namely, the university where each individual earned her B.A. and her Ph.D., as well as 
the university where she held her first job. Thirdly, we study how best to interact the migrant/stayer 
condition with department effects and vintage variables. The definition of all explanatory variables will be 
presented in due order below. Descriptive statistics for the total sample are included in the left-hand panel 
in Table 2, where the reference group for any set of dummy variables is marked with an asterisk. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Interestingly, these figures are of the same order of magnitude as those found in Ruiz-Castillo & Costas (2015) who study the 
productivity of 17.2 million authors in 30 broad scientific fields with publications in the period 2003-2011. 
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Table 2 around here 
Demographic variables 
As indicated in the Introduction, our measure of aggregate productivity up to 2007 favors older 
people. Together with the variable Age and (Age)2, we introduce a dummy variable, Young, that takes the 
value one for young people, defined as those who earn a Ph.D. at most 20 years before 2007. Taking into 
account that the median age for finishing a Ph.D. is approximately 30 (Scott & Sigfried, 2008), young people 
in our sample are those with at most 50 years of age in 2007. They represent approximately half of the total 
sample. To account for the possibility that the productivity effect of one more year of academic experience 
is different for young and older individuals, our specification includes an interaction between the cohort and 
the age variables. Finally, the dummy variable Female takes the value one for females. Thus, model 1 is the 
following: 
     Log Q = α0 + α1 Age + α2 Age
2 + α3 (Age x Young)+ α4 (Age
2 x Young)  + α5 Young + α6 Female + ε.       (1) 
Regression results for this model, as well as age, cohort, and gender effects are in the left-hand panel of 
Table 3. 
Table 3 around here 
The six variables of the model are highly significant. In agreement with human capital models, we find 
a humped-shaped progression of individual research productivity with academic age because the stock of 
human capital needs to be built up at the beginning of the career while, due to the finiteness of life, no new 
investment offsets depreciation and net investment declines (eventually) over time. Moreover, the young are 
more productive than the old and the young productivity gap of the young increases with experience. 
Finally, females –representing 14% of the total sample– are 57.9% less productive than males. At any rate, 
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age, cohort, and gender effects account for a large proportion of the variance: the adjusted R2 in model 1 is 
0.44.9 
In order to test how robust age and cohort effects are to the cohort definition, we experiment with 
two other specifications: the variable Young takes the value one when Age is less than or equal to 15 or 24, so 
that young people are individuals with at most 45 or 54 years of age in 2007. The percentage of young 
people becomes 45.8% and 67.1%, respectively (Panel A in Table 2). Regression results for model 1 are in 
Table 3. Except for Young in the last specification, all variables are again highly significant. Age and gender 
effects are practically the same as before. The only difference concerns cohort effects: being young is 
somewhat more important than before for the smaller subset of young people in the second specification, 
whereas it becomes negative for the larger subset of young people in the third specification. Nevertheless, 
the productivity gap between young and older people increases with experience in all cases. Judging from 
the adjusted R2, the importance of age, cohort, and gender effects is as large as before. 
In view of these results, we continue the analysis with the cohorts’ original definition. Nevertheless, in 
Section IV.3 we study the robustness of our key results with respect to alternative cohort specifications. 
Foreigners versus stayers: a first approximation 
The 81 departments in the sample are classified into Top and Bottom institutions using the Econphd 
department ranking (Table A in Appendix I). We begin by defining the former as the 25 top U.S. 
departments (that practically coincide with the top 25 departments in the world). Among the Bottom 
institutions, we distinguish between two categories: the last 27 U.S. departments, and the 29 non-U.S. 
departments located in the OSC.10 Group sizes are in Panel B in Table 2. We should emphasize that the two 
Bottom groups are heterogeneous categories with a large overlap in terms of the Econphd department 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Interestingly, “Years since Ph.D. accounted for 43% of the variance of log(total citations), 48% of the variance in log(h), 36% of the variance in 
log(e), and 54% of the variance in log(hm) [e and hm are variants of the h index]” (Nosek et al., 2010, p. 1287). 
10 Of course, which departments are in the “top 10”, “top 25” or “last 27” at any moment is open to debate. Moreover, even if 
this classification is appropriate for the period 2004-2007, individual departments are likely to have changed positions over the 
period of this study prior to 2007. Therefore, it is advisable to take this partition as representative of “top” or “bottom” 
departments in general. 
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ranking.11 It should be noted that in Section IV.3 we explore the consequences of considering a partition 
into five department categories: on one hand, among the first 25 U.S departments we distinguish between 
the top 10 and the next 15 U.S. departments whereas, on the other hand, we distinguish between the 
departments in Canada and the UK and the remaining OSC departments. 
As explained in the Introduction, individuals working in each of the two geographical areas in 2007 
can be partitioned into three groups: brain circulation, brain drain, and stayers (Panel C in Table 2). Note 
that brain circulation is a very small contingent in the U.S. (0.3% of the total), but a larger one in the OSC 
(7.1%). Otherwise, there are more stayers than foreigners in both areas. We begin by comparing the 
productivity of foreigners and stayers in the two geographical areas controlling for the individuals in brain 
circulation (dummy variables USbc and OSCbc), as well as the type of department in which they work in 
2007 (dummy variables Top25US and Last27US). Omitting demographic variables, model 2 is the following: 
Log Q = α0 + β1 FrgUS + β2 StayUS + β3 FrgOSC + δ1 Top25US  + δ2 Last27US + δ3 USbc + δ4 OSCbc + ε,   (2) 
where the constant includes OSC stayers. To test for the existence of department effects we specify the 
following hypothesis: 
 Between Top25US and Last27US,   H0:  δ1 - δ2 = 0; 
 Between foreigners in Last27US and OSC,  H0:  (δ2 + β1 ) - β3 = 0; 
 Between stayers in Last27US and OSC,  H0:  δ2 + β2 = 0. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In particular, the last 27 U.S. departments include nine institutions that range from positions 32 to the 44 in the Econphd 
ranking, and 18 departments ranging from positions 51 to the 78 position, while the 29 OSC departments include four 
departments in the range 12 to 24, seven departments ranging from positions 30 to the 45, and 18 departments ranging from 
positions 46 to the 81 (Table A in Appendix I). 
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In turn, the key comparisons between the productivity of foreigners and stayers requires testing whether β1 - 
β2 = 0 in the U.S., and whether β3 = 0 in the OSC. 
Together with demographic variables, we include a set of dummy variables that capture the 
progression of economists’ through their undergrtaduate and gradate education to the first part of their 
academic career. Specifically, these variables capture the university where individuals obtain their B.A., their 
Ph.D., or where they held their first job. The distribution of the 2,530 economists in the sample according 
to these career variables is in Panels D, E, and F in Table 2. In each case, we distinguish between different 
types of U.S. universities, universities in the European Union before the 2004 accession (EU hereafter), and 
universities from the Rest of the World (RW hereafter).  
The following three comments are in order. Firstly, U.S. graduate schools are very attractive for this 
set of highly productive economists. In particular, approximately 44% of them earned their Ph.D. at the ten 
top U.S. schools. Secondly, because some individuals returned home after earning their Ph.D., those holding 
a first job in the U.S. are almost 12 percentage points lower than those graduating there. Thirdly, after a re-
shuffling at the next stage, the number of people working in 2007 in the U.S. or in the European OSC 
increases somewhat, while the number of people working in the non-European OSC decreases. The end 
result is that only 38.7% of the sample is born in the U.S., but 62.0% end up working there in 2007 –a 
strong funneling effect towards the U.S. (see Albarrán et al., 2014a, for further details).  
Regression results for model 2 are in the left-hand panel of Table 4.12 The following five points 
should be noted. Firstly, because all USbc work in Top25US, the coefficient δ3 cannot be identified. Secondly, 
among control variables all demographic variables are significant. Age and cohort effects (column 1 in Table 
B.1 in Appendix I) are very similar to those analyzed in Table 3. On the other hand, only three of the other 
control variables are significant: individuals having earned a Ph.D. in Harvard or MIT or the RW, or having 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 All regressions in the paper include clustered standard errors by the university where each individual works in 2007. 
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had a first job in any of the ten top U.S. universities have a significantly greater productivity than the 
corresponding reference group. The inclusion of the 29 non-demographic dummy variables increases the 
adjusted R2 from 0.436 to 0.549. Thirdly, as expected, the difference  δ1 - δ2 = 0.6350 is statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.000), indicating the existence of strong department effects in the U.S. What about 
department effects between Last27US and OSC? We find that the expressions (δ2 + β1) - β3 = 0.1627 and δ2 
+ β2 = 0.0717 are not significantly different from zero (p-values 0.119 and 0.749). This indicates that the 
productivity of economists in the last 27 U.S. departments and the 29 OSC departments is indistinguishable. 
Given the overlapping of the department rankings in the two groups (see note 7), this is not a surprising 
result. Finally, the difference β1 - β2 = 0.2910 (p-value = 0.117) and the coefficient β3 (t-value = 1.67) are not 
significantly different from zero, indicating that foreigners and stayers in the two geographical areas appear 
to be equally productive. 
Table 4 around here 
 Foreigners versus stayers: final specification 
The existence of department effects in the U.S. requires discussing whether higher performing 
universities contribute to the productivity of individual researchers and/or whether they simply attract more 
productive individuals. As indicated in the Introduction, our data do not allow us to address this issue. 
However, the results on the existence of spillover effects are clearly negative (Han Kim et al., 2009, Azoulay 
et al., 2010, Waldinger, 2012, Borjas & Doran, 2014, and Dubois et al., 2014). In particular, in their important 
contribution to the decline of spillover effects in the top 25 U.S. university economics and finance 
departments over the 1970-2001 period, Han Kin et al. (2009) conclude that the loss of spillover effects 
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among elite universities is due to advances in communication technology.13 Naturally, the decline of 
spillover effects is compatible with the permanence of department effects. As Han Kin et al. (2009) indicate, 
“The difference in average individual productivity between the top 25 universities and the others has increased, not decreased, in 
the last three decades. Elite universities seem to attract and retain the most productive researchers, even though these universities 
do not make their faculty more productive” (p. 355). This is, of course, what we find in our dataset: highly 
productive economists tend to come together in institutions of high productivity and prestige in a 
hierarchically ordered manner. Han Kim et al. (2009) argue that, on the supply side, top researchers 
agglomerate in institutions with prestigious undergraduate programs and in departments with high past 
research reputations. Such agglomeration could be due to the utility and the prestige of co-location with 
other creative minds. This, together with the role of meritocratic criteria and a reasonable degree of ability in 
hiring and promoting decisions on the demand side in a highly competitive market, help account for the 
existence of a clear hierarchical department structure, such as the one revealed in the Econphd department 
ranking and the two types of U.S. departments distinguished so far.  
In this context, it seems convenient to compare the productivity of migrants and stayers within the 
top 25 and the last 27 U.S. departments. Omitting control variables, model 3 becomes: 
           Log Q = α0 + β1 FrgTop25US + β2 StyTop25US + β3 FrgLast27US + β4 StyLast27US + β5 FrgOSC  
                         + δ1 USbc + δ2 OSCbc + ε,                   (3) 
where the constant includes OSC stayers. It should be noted that the proportion of migrants in the three 
department categories are the following: 42.8% in the top U.S. departments, 38.7% in the bottom U.S. 
departments, and 38.5% in the OSC. Regression results for model 3 are in the middle panel in Table 4. Key 
productivity comparisons between migrants and stayers in the three department categories requires testing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 It should be noted that the list of 25 departments in Han Kim et al. (2009) includes our first 15 U.S. departments. Together 
with the University of British Columbia, located in Canada, three other of their departments appear between positions 16 to 20 
in our U.S. ranking, while the remaining six appear in the positions 26, 28, 30, 34, 43, and 46 of that ranking. 
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whether β1 - β2 = 0, β3 - β4 = 0, and β5 = 0, respectively. Test results –presented in column 1 in Table 5– are 
as follows. Firstly, in the last 27 U.S. departments β4 is not significantly different from zero, and foreigners 
are more productive than stayers. Secondly, the situation is the opposite in the top 25 U.S. departments and 
the OSC. 
Table 5 around here 
However, as observed in columns 3 and 4 in Table 6, the proportion of young and older people in the 
three department categories is very different for migrants and stayers. Thus, it seems essential to incorporate 
vintage effects in model 3.14 This is what we do in what we call the final specification, whose results for the 
total sample appear in the right-hand panel in Table 4. The following three points should be noted.  
Table 6 around here 
Firstly, among control variables all demographic variables are significant. However, in the presence of 
interactions between the variable Young and foreigners and stayers in all department categories, we must 
differentiate between cohort effects for young foreigners and young stayers in each department category 
(age and cohort effects are in column 2 in Table B.2 in Appendix I). Age effects are of the same order of 
magnitude as we have found in previous specifications. As expected, cohort effects for both foreigners and 
stayers are greater in the top 25 U.S. departments than in the last two bottom department categories. Cohort 
effects are greater for foreigners than for stayers in each department category. On the other hand, the only 
significant variables among the other control variables are the same three we have found in previous 
specifications. The adjusted R2 in the final specification is 0.551. 
Secondly, as observed in the right-hand panel in Table 4, 10 of the 13 variables describing the two 
cohorts of movers and stayers in the three department categories are significant (for a discussion of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 We thank a referee for pointing this out. 
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productivity of movers and stayers among U.S. and OSC nationals, see our companion paper Albarrán et al., 
2014b). For our purposes, the following result should be emphasized: 
• The productivity of both young and older stayers in the last 27 U.S. departments is indistinguishable 
from the productivity of the reference group, namely OSC older stayers. 
Thirdly, test results concerning the six productivity comparisons between foreigners and stayers are as 
follows (column 2 in Table 5): 
• In the top U.S. category, only older migrants are more productive than stayers. 
• In the bottom U.S. category, both young and older migrants are more productive than stayers. 
• In the OSC, the productivity of both cohorts of migrants is indistinguishable from the productivity 
of stayers. 
III.2. Results for the elite 
As indicated in the Introduction, the mixed evidence found in the literature concerning productivity 
comparisons between migrants and stayers in the U.S. for samples of different nature and different size 
suggests analyzing the question using different quality thresholds in our case. Consequently, we study 
whether the results in the total sample are maintained in the elite consisting of 833 economists with above 
average productivity.  
Descriptive statistics are in the right-hand side of Table 2. Four points should be noted. Firstly, the 
proportion of young people for all cohort definitions decreases: relative to the total sample, old people are 
overrepresented in the elite. Secondly, relative to the total sample the proportion of U.S. stayers (mostly in 
the top 25 U.S. departments) increases, whereas the proportion of migrants in the U.S. remains constant. 
Thirdly, the proportion of people of all sorts working in 2007 the OSC –brain circulation, migrants and 
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stayers– decreases. Finally, the proportions of migrants in the three department categories are the following: 
35.0% in the top U.S. departments, 40.6% in the bottom U.S. departments, and 29.4% in the OSC. 
Complete regression results for the elite appear in the last two columns in Table 4. Among 
demographic variables, the following two points should be noted. Firstly, among age and cohort variables 
only Age is significant. In any case, the size of age effects in the elite is much smaller than in the total 
sample. Two factors might help explain this pattern: (i) a stronger taste for “puzzle solving”, peer 
recognition, and monetary rewards for top researchers produces a flattening of the productivity profile 
(Levin and Stephan, 1991), and (ii) institutional explanatory variables –such as research funding and 
promotion policies– may operate differentially across the distribution of scientific performance favoring 
those on the top (Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2011).15 Secondly, the productivity of females –representing 
5.4% of the elite– is still smaller than the productivity of males, but the gender effect is considerably smaller 
than in the total sample: 15.4% rather than 57.9%. This is in line with the results in Kelchtermans and 
Veugelers (2012): although females are significantly less likely to reach top performance first, once they 
manage to do that the gender bias is considerably reduced. On the other hand, among the other control 
variables only earning a Ph.D. in any of the 50 schools different from Harvard and MIT has a negative 
significant effect relative to earning it in the EU. The adjusted R2 is 0.317, versus 0.551 in the total sample. 
Intuitively, increasing the quality threshold and reducing the sample size, would tend to make elite 
members more homogeneous among each other in each of the three department categories we have been 
studying. As a matter of fact, our extension of the Hunter et al. (2009) model in Appendix II establishes that 
the higher the quality threshold considered, the closer the average productivity of foreigners and stayers is 
expected to be. As can be observed in column 3 in Table 5, this is exactly what happens for all comparisons 
where foreigners were more productive than stayers in the total sample.  
IV. ROBUSTNESS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




IV.1. The treatment of the elite  
Following a referee’s suggestion, we have explored the elite’s role using quantile regressions. Our 
results indicate that the disappearance of the productivity differences between migrants and stayers in the 
U.S. is reached at the 95th percentile (regression results for the total sample are in Table C in Appendix I, 
whereas p-values for productivity comparisons are in column 4 in Table 5). Of course, quantile regressions 
use all data in the total sample but apply different weights at observations below and above a given 
percentile, whereas results for the elite are obtained using exclusively its 833 observations. Recall that the 
elite includes individuals with above average productivity beyond the 67th percentile of the Q distribution. 
Taking into account that the elite productivity distribution is as highly skewed as the total sample 
distribution, and the mean is located at the 65th percentile, OLS results for the elite are at, approximately, the 
88.5th percentile of the original distribution. Thus, using quantile regressions for the total sample or OLS for 
the elite leads to the same conclusions. 
IV.2. The partition of departments 
So far, we have distinguished between two department categories in the U.S.: the top 25 and the last 
27 departments. However, in view of the possible existence of department effects within the first category, 
it seems interesting to explore a partition including the top ten and the next 15 U.S. departments. On the 
other hand, Canada and the UK are English-speaking countries whose higher education systems are closer 
in governance to the U.S. system than to the systems in the other countries with at least one department in 
the sample (the Netherlands, Spain, Israel, Sweden, France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark and China). 
Therefore, it seems interesting to explore a partition including the eight UK departments and the four 
Canadian departments in one category, and the remaining 17 departments in the OSC in another. 
Surprisingly enough, in the total sample the proportion of young and older foreigners in Canada and the 
UK is considerably greater than in the other four department categories (descriptive statistics for movers 
and stayers in the two cohorts are in Table D in Appendix I). 
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Regression results for the key variables for the total sample and the elite including this partition into 
five department categories are in Table E in Appendix I (complete results are available upon request). We 
observe that, as expected, there are strong department effects: for migrants and stayers in both cohorts the 
top ten, the next 15, the last 27 U.S. departments, and the other OSC are hierarchically ordered. Moreover, 
the productivity of economists in Canada and the UK is indistinguishable from the productivity of those in 
the last 27 U.S. departments. 
Results and p-values concerning productivity comparisons between migrants and stayers are in Panel 
B in Table 5. Three points should be noted. Firstly, the main novelty is that the productivity difference 
between older migrants and older stayers in the top 25 U.S. departments in the previous partition is seen to 
be essentially due to the situation in the top 10 U.S. departments. Secondly, it is important to emphasize 
that, as before, all significant productivity differences in the U.S. in the total sample vanish when we move 
to the elite. This is in spite of the fact that the proportion of young and older foreigners in the bottom U.S. 
departments in the elite is considerably above average. Thirdly, there are two exceptions to the similarity 
between foreigners and stayers in the elite. The first one is among the old in Canada and the UK, where 
there is an above average proportion of foreigners (Table D in Appendix I). The second exception is among 
the small group of 27 young economists in other OSC. 
Given these results, for the sake of simplicity we continue the analysis restricting the attention to the 
partition of the 81 departments into only three categories. 
IV.3. The definition of the two cohorts 
Based on the analysis in Section III.1, so far we have considered young individuals with Age ≤ 20. 
Next, we must study the robustness of our results to alternative definitions, namely, when Age ≤ 15 and Age 
≤ 24 (key descriptive statistics for all cohorts are in Table 6). Regression results for the key variables for the 
total sample and the elite for the two new cohort definitions are in Table F in Appendix I (complete results 
are available upon request). Age, cohort, and gender effects in the total sample are in columns 1 and 3 in 
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Table B.2 in Appendix I. Two points should be noted. Firstly, as far as demographic variables are 
concerned, age and gender effects are very similar for the three cohort definitions. When Age ≤ 15 and Age 
≤ 20, the pattern of cohort effects are also very similar. The only difference is that the size of the effects is 
slightly greater when Age ≤ 15 than when Age ≤ 20. On the other hand, as we saw in model 1 being young 
becomes negative for the largest subset of young people in the third specification (Table 3). Nevertheless, 
apart from the sign, the productivity gap between young and older people increases with experience in all 
cases. Secondly, the only significant variables among the other control variables in the total sample under 
the two new cohort definitions are the same three we have found when Age ≤ 20. Finally, the adjusted R2 in 
the total sample and the elite is of the same order of magnitude for the three cohort definitions. 
As far as the key productivity comparisons, p-values are in Panel A in Table 7. Three points should be 
noted. Firstly, in the last 27 U.S. departments the pattern is the same for all cohort definitions: both young 
and older migrants are more productive than stayers in the total sample, but productivity differences vanish 
in the elite. 
Table 7 around here 
Secondly, as the age below which individuals are considered young increases, the proportion of older 
people in the total sample necessarily decreases. But this decrease is more pronounced among migrants in all 
department categories (Table 6). In particular, the small percentage of older migrants in the top 25 U.S. 
departments is very productive. Thus, when Age ≤ 20 and Age ≤ 24 foreigners are more productive than 
stayers in this category.16 However, when this contingent is mixed up with individuals between 45 and 50 
years of age, the difference between the regression coefficients of older migrants and stayers in the top 25 
U.S. departments –equal to 0.2936 (Table E in Appendix I)– is no longer significant (p-value = 0.127 in 
Table 7).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Specifically, when Age ≤ 24 the difference between the regression coefficients of older migrants and stayers in the top 25 U.S. 
departments is equal to 0.4896 (Table E in Appendix I) and the p-value is 0.016 (Table 7), while when Age ≤ 20 this difference is 
0.3379 (Table 4) and the p-value is 0.086 (Table 6).  
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Thirdly, the situation among older people in the OSC is exactly the opposite: as the size of the young 
cohort increases, the t-value of older foreigners in the OSC decreases from 2.0 to 1.65 and 0.6. The 
superiority of older migrants over older stayers in the OSC when Age ≤ 15 is the only productivity 
difference that remains in the elite. 
We conclude that the differences in the results for the three cohort definitions are minor. 
Consequently, although these differences should be taken into account in the discussion Section, there are 
no reasons to depart from our preferred specification where Young = 1 if Age ≤ 20. 
IV.4. The measurement of individual productivity 
So far, we have used index Q as our productivity measure. In this Subsection we explore the 
robustness of our results when we use index Q’, characterized by a less elitist weighting scheme of our four 
journal classes, and index P, namely, the unweighted number of publications of all sorts. Regression results 
for the key variables for the total sample and the elite are in Table G in Appendix I (complete results are 
available upon request), while p-values for productivity comparisons are in Panel B in Table 7. 
Results concerning productivity comparisons between foreigners and stayers under index Q’ coincide 
with those obtained under index Q. However, using the unweighted number of publications breaks up the 
unanimous agreement concerning the superiority of foreigners over stayers in the last 27 U.S. departments 
in the total sample: young foreigners and stayers are now indistinguishable. Moreover, contrary also to all 
previous results, young migrants are more productive the young stayers in the OSC in the elite.  
We conclude that, as long as we recognize the merit of publishing in more prestigious journal classes, 
our results are robust to different weighting schemes. 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
V.1. Summary and interpretation of results 
Generally, individual productivity is a variable difficult to measure in all sectors. However, the reward 
structure of science around the priority of discovery provides a powerful incentive for scientists in all 
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disciplines to publish the results of their research. The fact that publications, as well as their impact through 
citations, are observable facilitates the measurement of an important aspect of scientific productivity. In this 
paper, we have measured the individual productivity of a set of highly productive economists in terms of a 
quality index that weights the number of publications from the beginning of everyone’s academic career up 
to 2007 in four equivalent journal classes. 
Individual productivity distributions in all scientific fields are highly skewed regardless of the 
productivity measure and the size of the population studied. Accounting for such large differences for 
highly productive economists is the thread that runs throughout the paper. We have information on three 
types of variables: (i) age and gender; (ii) dummy variables capturing the progression of each individual 
career from college to graduate school, the first job, and the current job in 2007, and (iii) dummy variables 
capturing whether each individual is a mover –brain circulation or brain drain– or a stayer. For the total 
sample consisting of 2,530 economists, demographic variables account for 43.6% of the variance. The 
remaining explanatory variables raise this figure up to 55.1%. 
The paper has focused on productivity comparisons between migrants and stayers in 52 U.S. 
departments and 29 departments in what we have called the OSC, consisting of eleven countries with at 
least one department in the sample. Our preferred specification includes: 
• A quality index that weights very heavily publications in the best journals. 
• A partition of the population into two cohorts, where young people are less than 50 years old in 
2007. 
 • A partition of the top 81 departments in the world in 2004 into three categories: the top 25 U.S. 
departments, the bottom 27 U.S. departments, and the 29 OSC departments.  
• An elite consisting of researchers with above average productivity. 
As in Hunter et al. (2009), in the absence of information on the location decision we can only present 
correlations describing stylized facts whose explanation requires further research. The main findings –which 
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are robust to the treatment of the elite, a finer partition into five department categories, different cohort 
definitions, and a less elitist quality index– are the following four.  
1. In a world of decreasing transportation, communication, and moving costs of all sorts we should 
expect the convergence between the average productivity of foreigners and stayers (Hunter et al., 2009).  
This is what we find in the total sample for the young people in the top 25 U.S departments (representing 
18.7% of the population), and in both cohorts in the OSC (representing 31.0% of the total). However, this 
is not the case in the following two groups.  
2. Older migrants are more productive than stayers in the top 25 U.S. departments (representing 
16.4% of the total). Two qualifications should be noted. Firstly, migrants between 45 and 50 years of age 
exhibit a worse performance relative to stayers of that age. Consequently, the superiority of old migrants 
vanishes when we define young people as those with Age ≤ 15 (Section IV.3). Secondly, the superiority of 
older migrants takes place in the top 10 U.S. departments (Section IV.2). Therefore, the key finding is that 
foreigners are more productive than stayers among people older than 50 in the top ten U.S. departments 
(representing 7.7% of the total).  
3. Perhaps the most remarkable finding of the paper is that the productivity of U.S. stayers is much 
lower in the bottom than in the top U.S. departments. As a matter of fact, the productivity of stayers in the 
last 27 U.S. departments is indistinguishable from the productivity of stayers in the OSC. Instead, the 
productivity of migrants is hierarchically ordered in the top 25 U.S. departments, the last 27 U.S. 
departments, and the 29 OSC departments. Consequently, the standing of the bottom U.S. departments is 
maintained thanks to the productivity of its foreign faculty. More importantly for our purposes, the 
productivity of migrants is greater than the productivity of stayers in both cohorts in the last 27 U.S. 
departments (representing 26.5% of the total).  
How should we interpret the superiority of migrants over stayers in some groups (i.e. old people in 
the top ten U.S. departments, and both cohorts in the bottom U.S. departments) in the total sample? One 
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possibility is that migration per se is a cause of superior performance, in which case there are positive 
externalities to be gained by promoting mobile scientists to work with domestic scientists. As pointed out by 
Franzoni et al. (2014), in this case migration is not a zero-sum game in the sense that the benefits that accrue 
to the destination country do not necessarily come at the expense of the sending country.  
An alternative interpretation is that the talent distributions under comparison are not the same. This is 
the type of explanation we provisionally favor. Consider first the situation in the top 25 U.S. departments. 
In the context of the Hunter et al. (2009) model, the superiority of migrants simply means that –according to 
the productivity measures used in this paper– some of the best older economists in the world happen to be 
foreigners that have been attracted by these prestigious U.S. departments. On the other hand, a possible 
explanation of the situation in the bottom U.S. departments is the following. U.S. nationals have to balance 
the attraction and costs of an academic career with the opportunities that the U.S. economy offers to highly 
skilled economists outside academia. Judging from their relatively weak performance, those who choose an 
academic life at the bottom of the scale are considerably less productive and/or less motivated than those 
who are able to work at the top 25 departments. Instead, foreigners in the last 27 U.S. departments appear 
to find good reasons to pursue an academic career in the U.S., and strive to maintain a good performance 
just below what comparable migrants exhibit at the top 25 U.S. departments, and essentially above what 
foreigners exhibit in the OSC (p-values for the young and the old in the last comparison are equal to 0.123 
and 0.055). 
4. Our last finding is that, in agreement with our extension of the Hunter et al. (2009) model, as soon 
as we restrict attention to an elite consisting of economists with above average productivity all productivity 
differences between migrants and stayers in the U.S. vanish.  
V.2. Policy considerations 
Regardless of interpretation, the superior ex post migrants’ performance in some groups and the 
indistinguishable performance between foreigners and stayers in the remaining groups would tend to 
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confirm the validity of policies aimed at facilitating increased brain exchange across countries (Franzoni et 
al., 2014). We may add that, as long as the concentration of talent in the U.S. results from the working of a 
highly competitive market worldwide, efficiency is well served from a global point of view. Furthermore, we 
should take into account that migrants decide where to live in a voluntary way. However, there are two 
objections to this view.  
Firstly, a number of contributions –written from a European perspective– explain this situation in 
terms of differences in resources and university governance on both sides of the Atlantic (Ali et al., 2007, 
Bauwens et al., 2008, Aghion et al., 2008, Veugelers & Van der Ploeg, 2008, Drèze and Estevan, 2009, and 
Section 5.2.1 in Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). From this perspective, it might be argued that that the 
degree of concentration of the best talent in the U.S. constitutes only a second best. Better governance and 
some additional resources for research institutions in the EU and the RW may give rise to an improved 
global situation with the highly productive less concentrated in the U.S.  
Secondly, other qualified economists question whether the concentration of the best talent working 
and/or studying in a few U.S. universities has gone too far. On one hand, Jacques Drèze states: “It is thought 
provoking that worldwide economic research is being pursued under the leadership of a couple hundred university professors 
trained and employed by a handful of U.S. departments.” (Drèze and Estevan, 2007, p. 286). On the other hand, 
Oswald (2007, p.2) has pointed out that great discoveries often come from unconventional ways of 
thinking. “This makes me believe that dropping so many of Planet Earth’s scientists into the same American part of the globe 
may make them worryingly homogeneous. Such intellectual homogeneity could, in the long run, be bad for scientific knowledge 
and thus for human welfare on our planet.”  
We should close this discussion indicating that, needless to say, immigration/emigration and other 
policy recommendations requires studying the results from more representative samples, including the high-
skilled working outside the academic sector, as well as the low-skilled migrants. This should incorporate the 
recent literature on immigration emphasizing different channels through which sending countries may 
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benefit from international mobility in a context of increasing globalization. However, progressing in these 
directions is beyond the scope of this paper.17 
V.3. Contributions to the literature  
Our contributions to the literature can be summarized as follows. 
1. Given the importance of department effects, comparisons between foreigners and stayers must be 
done within each subgroup of a relevant partition into top and bottom departments. Following this practice, 
we have been able to isolate the superiority of migrants over stayers among the older individuals in the top 
ten and in the two cohorts in the bottom U.S. departments in the total sample. 
2. Confronting foreigners and stayers in a relatively large sample of highly productive scientists or in a 
small sample of elite scientists in the upper tail of the productivity distribution are different matters. In our 
case, we have found that all productivity differences between the two groups in the U.S. in the total sample 
disappear in an elite consisting of economists with above average productivity. Note also that this 
distinction makes compatible apparently divergent results in the literature for datasets of scientists of very 
different size and composition. 
Whether the situation is different in top and bottom institutions, and whether the differences –if any– 
in larger samples disappear in elite subsets are interesting topics for further research in other scientific 
disciplines. Similarly, it would be interesting to know whether the high proportion of foreigners and their 
higher productivity relative to stayers found in the last 27 U.S. economics departments are maintained for 
other, less productive U.S. institutions.  
Under the limitations of our data, we have only offered some provisional interpretations of our 
results. Rather than a positive migration externality, we have suggested that the superiority of older migrants 
in the top U.S. departments might be simply due to a difference in the upper tail of the productivity 
distributions of people born outside and inside the U.S. Similarly, the superiority of migrants in the bottom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For a discussion of possible global and national effects of high-skilled international migration for sending and receiving 
countries, see Regets (2001), Commander et al. (2003), Ellerman (2006), and Gibson and McKenzie (2012). 
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U.S. departments might be due to a switch away from the academic sector by a subset of economists more 
attracted by opportunities in other sectors of the U.S. economy than by the benefits associated to academic 
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APPENDIX I. STATISTICAL MATERIAL 
 
Table A. Publications in journals of class A, B, C and D, and quality indices for 2,705 faculty members at 81 economics 
departments in 2007 
 
  
Number of scholars 
  




    
 




  Total Without any A B C D Total 
Quality 
Index, Q  
Quality 
Index, Q’  
   
publication  





(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
81 TOP ECONOMICS 
DEPARTMENTS: 
         
 
 
Ordered according to the 
Econphd (2004) ranking 2,705 175 
 
9,595 20,261 10,260 28,255 68,371 777,530 474,065 





         
 
1 Harvard University 55 0 
 
842 914 299 862 2,917 50,046 28,337 
2 University of Chicago 30 1 
 
291 294 110 254 949 16,964 9,564 
3 MIT 40 2 
 
602 593 208 948 2,351 35,171 19,958 
4 U. of California, Berkley 58 1 
 
463 660 286 754 2,163 30,890 18,044 
5 Princeton University 54 4 
 
509 642 172 826 2,149 31,848 18,286 
6 Stanford University 42 4 
 
314 316 100 318 1,048 18,218 10,258 
7 Northwestern University 35 4 
 
230 307 87 279 903 14,606 8,384 
8 University of Pennsylvania 30 1 
 
215 358 89 162 824 14,666 8,487 
9 Yale University 42 6 
 
350 518 145 706 1,719 23,346 13,611 
10 New York University 44 1 
 
348 529 129 524 1,530 23,153 13,419 
 Next 15           
11 U. of California, LA 45 2 
 
213 250 182 379 1,024 13,741 8,049 
13 Columbia University 45 0 
 
388 529 209 565 1,691 25,274 14,660 
14 U. of Wisconsin, Madison 30 5 
 
86 238 74 154 552 7,608 4,624 
15 Cornell University 32 1 
 
156 393 182 472 1,203 13,699 8,432 
16 University of Michigan 54 6 
 
216 348 145 443 1,152 15,173 8,968 
17 University of Maryland 39 2 
 
145 257 229 304 935 11,333 6,919 
19 U. of Texas, Austin 33 2 
 
114 243 120 328 805 9,253 5,638 
21 U. of Cal., San Diego 40 3 
 
180 394 103 318 995 14,046 8,373 
22 University of Rochester 19 3 
 
57 101 51 100 309 4,201 2,505 
23 Ohio State University 39 2 
 
139 292 170 344 945 11,304 6,894 
25 U. of Illinois, Urbana 27 2 
 
45 176 91 209 521 5,195 3,324 
26 Boston University 38 4 
 
157 240 129 189 715 10,843 6,374 
27 Brown University 28 3 
 
125 184 150 128 587 8,788 5,218 
28 U. California, Davis 31 1 
 
55 191 158 240 644 6,253 4,030 
29 University of Minnesota 26 3 
 
126 191 50 101 468 8,306 4,781 
 Last 27           
32 U. of Southern California 31 4 
 
87 285 160 652 1,184 9,367 6,042 
33 Michigan State U. 44 1 
 
101 328 182 340 951 10,392 6,550 
35 Duke University 43 0 
 
148 296 174 554 1,172 11,958 7,344 
38 PA State University 24 2 
 
65 154 84 191 494 5,605 3,451 
40 Carnegie Mellon U. 23 1 
 
57 103 31 74 265 4,085 2,399 
41 U. of North Carolina 24 2 
 
22 144 69 240 475 3,694 2,465 
42 Boston College 26 1 
 
69 223 114 222 628 7,011 4,402 
43 CA Institute of Technology 17 0 
 
88 162 74 136 460 6,530 3,886 
34 
 
44 Texas A and M 25 1 
 
50 161 103 183 497 5,216 3,308 
49 University of Indiana 26 2 
 
27 140 111 159 437 4,005 2,654 
51 Johns Hopkins 14 0 
 
80 171 54 104 409 6,193 3,684 
52 Rutgers University 33 1 
 
41 153 157 336 687 5,213 3,471 
53 University of Virginia 32 4 
 
67 157 126 142 492 5,933 3,682 
54 Vanderbilt University 34 1 
 
95 275 227 529 1,126 9,816 6,314 
55 Georgetown University 25 2 
 
45 175 63 73 356 4,876 3,038 
56 Arizona State University 28 3 
 
59 244 171 344 818 7,390 4,819 
57 University of Arizona 25 6 
 
39 87 72 103 301 3,400 2,113 
58 Dartmouth College 29 2 
 
45 136 123 234 538 4,812 3,109 
60 University of Washington 25 1 
 
82 271 140 181 674 8,366 5,231 
62 Iowa State University 44 0 
 
34 218 362 809 1,423 7,611 5,479 
63 Washington U., St Louis 30 1 
 
133 246 177 220 776 10,292 6,225 
67 Purdue University 20 5 
 
29 87 86 184 386 3,165 2,064 
70 University of Pittsburgh 25 5 
 
36 142 50 174 402 4,044 2,564 
72 University of Iowa 18 3 
 
31 139 53 77 300 3,720 2,352 
75 Rice University 19 1 
 
63 151 91 206 511 5,537 3,431 
77 U. of California, Irvine 25 3 
 
23 143 136 238 540 4,119 2,808 
78 University of Florida 18 1 
 
30 109 93 269 501 3,662 2,424 	              
	  
NON-U.S. DEPARTMENTS 
IN OTHER SAMPLE 
COUNTRIES 
         
 	   European Union           
12 London Sch. of Economics 55 4 
 
189 421 116 441 1,167 15,012 9,011 
18 Toulouse University 78 0 
 
126 421 203 830 1,580 13,403 8,575 
24 Tilburg University 54 2 
 
39 377 301 1,238 1,955 10,259 7,293 
31 Oxford University 44 1 
 
153 395 177 634 1,359 13,741 8,529 
34 University of Warwick 44 2 
 
88 393 204 375 1,060 11,014 7,085 
37 University of Amsterdam 39 1 
 
19 202 125 333 679 4,873 3,358 
39 Cambridge University 31 1 
 
70 207 73 342 692 6,685 4,177 
45 European Institute 12 1 
 
23 152 49 161 385 3,655 2,386 
46 U. Carlos III, Spain 56 5 
 
15 191 81 377 664 4,328 2,992 
47 Univ. College London 35 2 
 
120 292 103 376 891 10,174 6,211 
48 University of Essex 30 2 
 
30 148 73 95 346 3,953 2,540 
59 Stockholm University 18 0 
 
23 86 51 216 376 2,732 1,791 
65 University of York 42 1 
 
24 139 87 398 648 3,965 2,703 
66 U. Pompeu Fabra 39 3 
 
48 143 54 428 673 4,817 3,088 
68 University of Nottingham 47 0 
 
30 305 211 847 1,393 7,888 5,552 
71 Stockholm School of Ecs. 15 1 
 
16 86 68 332 502 2,670 1,852 
73 Erasmus University 22 1 
 
15 149 95 410 669 3,815 2,675 
74 University of Copenhagen 46 4 
 
10 179 71 317 577 3,828 2,662 
76 Catholic Univ. of Louvain 40 0 
 
24 221 140 678 1,063 5,793 4,068 
79 U. Autónoma, Barcelona 37 4 
 
15 98 68 416 597 2,894 2,036 
80 Free Univ. of Amsterdam 23 2 
 
11 115 55 183 364 2,678 1,828 
81 University of Bonn 26 5 
 
56 147 104 517 824 5,586 3,627 
 
Other: Canada, China, and 
Israel           
  20 Univ. of British Columbia 30 3  73 188 110 160 531 6,560 4,050 
  30 Queen's University 26 3  42 213 120 143       518 5,738 3,713 
36 University of Tel Aviv 16 1  58 205 70 122 455 5,937 3,682 
35 
 
  50 University of Montreal 23 1  18 160 122 155 455 4,007 2,725 
61 University of Toronto 53 8  99 255 190 402 946 9,327 5,882 
64 Hebrew University 26 0  133 219 157 408 917 9,955 6,043 







Table B.1. Age and cohort effects when Young  = 1 if Age  ≤20 in models 2 and 3 for the total sample 
 
 
             MODEL 2           MODEL 3  
      (1)     (2)            
•  Age effects when: 
Age  = 5   0.2789   0.3319      
 Age  = 10  0.1709   0.2781     
 Age  = 30  0.0498   0.0524     
 
•  Cohort effects when: 
 Age  = 5   0.544   0.5356                 
 Age  = 10  0.996   0.9849                 
 
 
Table B.2. Age, cohort and gender effects the final specification for the total sample when Young  = 1 if: 
 
       
                Age  ≤15             Age  ≤20             Age  ≤24 
       (1)     (2)     (3) 
•  Age effects when: 
 Age  = 5   0.2656  0.2773  0.3178 
 Age  = 10  0.1764  0.1704  0.2707 
 Age  = 30  0.0538  0.0499  0.0029   
 
•  Cohort effects for foreigners 
      Top 25 U.S. departments 
 Age  = 5   1.7491  1.5519  -1.4101 
 Age  = 10  2.1117  2.0001  -0.1226 
      Last 27 U.S. departments 
 Age  = 5   1.2235  0.7708  -1.6805 
 Age  = 10               1.5860  1.2189  -0.3930 
      29 OSC departments 
 Age  = 5   1.0255  0.8469  -2.0838 
 Age  = 10  1.3880  1.2950  -0.7421 
 
   •  Cohort effects for stayers 
      Top 25 U.S. departments 
 Age  = 5   1.6541  1.4405  -1.5365 
 Age  = 10  2.0142  1.8886  -0.2490 
      Last 27 U.S. departments 
 Age  = 5   0.7942  0.2228  -2.2845 
 Age  = 10  1.1568  0.6709  -0.9970 
      29 OSC departments 
 Age  = 5   0.8853  0.6942  -2.2870 
 Age  = 10  1.2479  1.1424  -1.0004 
 
•  Gender effects   0.5575  0.5550   0.5602 
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Table C. Results for the final specification (productivity measure = Q index, Young  = 1 if Age  ≤20). Quantile 
regression results for the 95th percentile in the total sample  
 
Dependent variable: Log Q   
                                             
I. KEY EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
CURRENT JOB = U.S.                              Coeff.  t-value                 
  1.        Brain circulation    0.8694 1.6     
      Top 25, Young       
  2.        Foreigners     0.7650 2.8*     
  3.        Stayers     0.5734 1.7      
      Top 25, Old       
  4.        Foreigners     0.6501 3.5*     
  5.        Stayers     0.4337 1.86                  
       Last 27, Young       
  6.        Foreigners     0.2298 0.8     
  7.        Stayers     0.0167 0.05                  
      Last27, Old     
  8.        Foreigners     0.2323 1.1     
  9.        Stayers     0.0874 0.3     
 
CURRENT JOB = OSC 
10.        Brain circulation    0.0199 0.1     
     Young     
11.        Foreigners     0.1073 0.4     
12.        Stayers                               -0.0310    -0.1     
     Old     
13.        Foreigners     0.2863 1.0     
14.        Stayers = Reference group  
 
 
II. CONTROL VARIABLES 
    A. Demographic variables   Coeff.        t-value                            
1. Age                 0.1329       11.7*                
2. Age2                                              -0.0013        -6.2*                 
3. Young x Age     0.1511         5.7*   
4. Young x Age2                                                 -0.0060        -5.2*                 
5. Young                                                         -0.3473        -1.3*                
6. Female                                            -0.2967        -3.8*                
 
     B. University of B.A. 
U.S. 
1. Top 10 U.S.                0.0373         0.2     
2. Next 15 U.S.                  0.0047         0.02    
3. Next 27 U.S.                                           -0.0065        -0.03    
4. Other U.S.                               -0.0667           -0.03      
 
Outside U.S. 
5. Reference group = EU       




     C. University of Ph.D.  
U.S. 
1. Harvard & MIT      0.0935       0.7                              
2. Other Top 10 U.S.                             -0.1980      -1.7                              
3. Next 15 U.S.                              -0.2054      -1.7                              
4. Next 27 U.S.                                           -0.0468      -0.3                             
5. Other U.S.                                           -0.1381      -0.6                              
 
Outside U.S. 
6. Reference group = EU 
7. RW       0.0352       0.2                               
 
     D. University of first job  
U.S. 
1. Top 10 U.S.     0.1927        1.7                    
2. Next 15 U.S.                              -0.0805          -0.7       
3. Next 27 U.S.                              -0.0804       -0.7                     
4. Other U.S.                                           -0.1606       -1.2                            
 
Outside U.S. 
5. Reference group = EU + Missing 
6. RW                                            -0.1142        -1.2                              
7. Missing                             -0.7959        -2.1*     
 
Constant     4.0239        20.7*     
 
 
N      2,530        










Table D. Descriptive statistics in the total sample and the elite. Movers & stayers for the partition into five department 
categories (Young  = 1 if Age  ≤  20) 
  
      Total sample         Elite       
CURRENT JOB = U.S.                 Freq.   %           Freq.   %     
     1. Brain c i r cu la t ion        8  0.3       5   0.6           
       A. Top 10,       Young  
    2. Fore igners     124   4.9    40   4.8    
    3. Stayers       83   3.3    35    4.2      
    Old 
    4. Fore igners       54   2.1    50   6.0    
    5. Stayers     141   5.6  123 14.8    
         B. Next 15,    Young  
    6. Fore igners     144   5.7    25   3.0    
    7. Stayers     123   4.9    33   4.0      
     Old 
    8. Fore igners       62   2.4    45   5.4    
    9. Stayers     157   6.2  101 12.1   
         C. Last 27,     Young  
   10. Fore igners     186   7.3    30   3.6    
   11. Stayers     135   5.3    12    1.4      
    Old 
   12. Fore igners       74   2.9    44   5.3    
   13. Stayers     276 10.9    96 11.5     
 
CURRENT JOB = OSC 
     
      D. Canada + UK  
  14. Brain c i r cu la t ion      53   2.1    19   2.3 
             Young  
  15. Fore igners     195   7.7    12   1.4    
  16. Stayers       66   2.6      9    1.1      
          Old 
  17. Fore igners       50   2.0    27   3.2    
  18. Stayers       68   2.7    36   4.3 
        E. Other OSC 
  19. Brain c i r cu la t ion    128   5.1    45   5.4      
          Young  
  20. Fore igners     104   4.1    10   1.2    
  21. Stayers     189   7.5    17   2.0      
          Old 
  22. Fore igners       22   0.9      8   1.0    
  23. Stayers       88   3.5    26   3.1      
             Total             2,530       100.0                      833       100.0              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Proportion of foreigners in the double partition by department categories and cohorts 
 
         Total sample      Elite 
     Young  Old   Young  Old 
A. Top 10           59.6  27.7   53.3  28.1    
B. Next 15       53.9  28.3   43.1  30.8  
C. Last 27           57.9  21.1   71.4  31.4    
D. Canada + UK       67.9  34.5   44.4  35.5 
E. Other OSC          26.9  15.2   27.0  14.8 
Total          51.3  25.3   48.9  29.3 
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Table E. Results for the final specification (productivity measure = Q index, Young  = 1 if Age  ≤20) for the 
partition of the 81 departments into five classes. Total sample and elite  
 
Dependent variable: Log Q   
                        TOTAL SAMPLE                  ELITE       
I. KEY EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
CURRENT JOB = U.S.                Coeff.  t-value          Coeff.  t-value       
  1.         Brain circulation   1.4973 3.0*    0.8231 2.6* 
      Top 10, Young       
  2.         Foreigners    2.1255 7.1*    0.5217 4.1* 
  3.         Stayers    2.0026 6.0*    0.5466 2.7*   
     Top 10, Old      
  4.        Foreigners    1.8711 8.1*    0.6744    6.6* 
  5.        Stayers    1.4541 4.6*                0.4446    2.6* 
     Next 15, Young       
  6.        Foreigners    1.6468 5.7*    0.3879 2.8* 
  7.        Stayers    1.5001 3.7*    0.2516 1.4  
     Next 15, Old       
  8.        Foreigners    1.2624 5.1*    0.3098 3.3*  
  9.        Stayers    0.9294 3.0*                0.1726    1.0 
      Last 27, Young        
10.        Foreigners    1.3039 4.8*    0.3146 2.5* 
11.        Stayers    0.8688 2.6*                0.2384    1.5 
      Last 27, Old     
12.        Foreigners    1.0605 4.4*    0.1875 2.1* 
13.        Stayers    0.4601 1.5    0.1280 0.8 
 
CURRENT JOB = OSC 
14.       Brain circulation, Canada + UK  1.1364 3.8*    0.3285 2.4* 
15.       Brain circulation, Other OSC  0.9316 4.8*    0.2888 2.9* 
    Canada + UK, Young     
16.        Foreigners    1.2493 4.6*    0.2693 2.3* 
17.        Stayers    1.0100 3.5*    0.3077 1.89 
     Canada + UK, Old     
18.        Foreigners    0.8327 3.2*    0.1912 1.8 
19.        Stayers    0.8076 3.1*    0.0522 0.7 
     Other OSC, Young     
20.        Foreigners                0.8193     3.0*    0.3139 2.3 
21.        Stayers     0.8830  3.6*    0.1050 0.8 
     Other OSC, Old     
22.     Foreigners                0.2188     0.7    0.0104 0.1 
23.     Stayers = Reference group  
 
Constant    1.5129  7.2*    5.4195   24.3*  
 
 
N     2,530       833 







Table F. Results for the total sample and the elite under alternative cohort definitions (productivity index = Q) 
 
             Young  = 1 if: 
    
Dependent variable: Log Q      Age  ≤  15        Age  ≤  24 
       
I. KEY EXPLANATORY VARIABLES      Total sample       Elite   Total sample        Elite  
CURRENT JOB = U.S.                Coeff.  t-value     Coeff.  t-value     Coeff.  t-value     Coeff.  t-value    
  1.         Brain circulation   1.0832 2.3* 0.7748 2.6*  1.2633 2.6* 0.8321 2.7* 
      Top 25, Young       
  2.         Foreigners    1.2281 5.2* 0.1469 0.7  1.4834 5.6* 0.4443 3.1* 
  3.         Stayers    1.1321 3.9* 0.1569 0.6  1.3569 4.6* 0.3401 1.95 
     Top 25, Old       
  4.         Foreigners    1.0520 5.9* 0.4034 5.0*  1.1937 5.7* 0.4337 4.6* 
  5.         Stayers    0.7584 3.0*       0.2717    2.0*  0.7041 2.7* 0.3342 2.4* 
      Last 27, Young        
  6.         Foreigners    0.7024 3.0* 0.0923 0.4  1.0129 3.9* 0.2093 1.6 
  7.         Stayers    0.2732 0.9        0.0791    0.3  0.6089 2.1* 0.2160 1.3 
     Last 27, Old  
  8.         Foreigners    0.5640 3.2* 0.1261 1.84  0.5696 2.4* 0.1942 2.2* 
  9.         Stayers    0.0998 0.4 0.1094 0.8  0.0245 0.1 0.1550 1.1 
 
CURRENT JOB = OSC 
10.           Brain circulation   0.3704 2.3* 0.1914 2.4*  0.6538 2.9* 0.2602 2.4* 
       Young     
11.          Foreigners    0.5044 2.6* 0.0351 0.2  0.8096 3.6* 0.2033 1.5 
12.          Stayers                0.3642    1.6        -0.1021    -0.4  0.6064 2.7* 0.1234 0.8 
       Old     
13.          Foreigners    0.2737 2.0* 0.1181 2.3*  0.1061 0.6 0.1560 1.84 




Constant    1.5321 9.0* 5.5120   21.3*  5.7092 6.9* 5.8398   10.1*  
 
 
N     2,530   833   2,530   833 










Table G. Results for the total sample and the elite under alternative productivity measures (Young  = 1 if Age  ≤  20) 
 
         Productivity index: 
    
Dependent variable: Log Q           Q’                P   
       
I. KEY EXPLANATORY VARIABLES      Total sample       Elite   Total sample       Elite  
CURRENT JOB = U.S.                Coeff.  t-value     Coeff.  t-value     Coeff.  t-value     Coeff.  t-value    
  1. Brain circulation    1.0184 2.4* 0.6640 2.1*  0.4533 1.4 0.1928 0.7 
      Top 25, Young       
  2.         Foreigners    1.2814 5.1* 0.3271 2.8*  0.6871 4.0* 0.1379 1.2 
  3.         Stayers    1.1925 4.3* 0.2289 1.3  0.6559 3.4* 0.1470 0.7 
      Top 25, Old       
  4.         Foreigners    0.9925 5.5* 0.4036 4.7*  0.5061 5.3.4 0.1026 1.3 
  5.         Stayers    0.6981 2.9*       0.1845    1.2  0.3550 1.90*     -0.0347   -0.2 
       Last 27, Young       
  6.         Foreigners    0.8470 3.4* 0.2292 2.0*  0.5178 3.0* 0.2468 1.6 
  7.         Stayers    0.5240 1.88        0.1651    0.9  0.4294 2.2* 0.0560 0.3 
      Last 27, Old     
  8.         Foreigners    0.5859 3.1* 0.1226 1.5  0.2717 2.0*       -0.0555   -0.7 
  9.         Stayers    0.0945 0.4 0.0600 0.4              -0.0342   -0.2         -0.0477   -0.3 
 
CURRENT JOB = OSC 
10. Brain circulation    0.5446 2.8* 0.1897 2.0*  0.4335 2.6* 0.1232 1.3 
     Young     
11.          Foreigners    0.6745 3.0* 0.2024 1.6  0.4169 2.5* 0.1486 1.1 
12.         Stayers                0.5409    2.6*        0.0700    0.7  0.4003 2.6*       -0.0158  -0.2 
      Old     
13.         Foreigners    0.2422 1.6 0.1029 1.5  0.0415 0.4         -0.0591  -0.8 
14.        Stayers = Reference group  
 
Constant    1.6006 8.5* 5.0040  16.6*  0.4916 4.1* 3.8631  11.2* 
 
 
N     2,530    843   2,530   835 








APPENDIX II. THE HUNTER, OSWALD & CHARLTON (2009) MODEL 
 
Consider a world in which scientists vary in their innate ability and productivity. Let q be an 
individual’s productivity that is defined to lie between 0 and 1. The talent distribution is described by a 
density function f(q). ‘Highly productive’ scientists have productivity greater than a minimum threshold of 
quality, q*. Such scientists can choose whether or not to move to a host country, where they are assumed to 
perceive a percentage wage premium, p, compared to the home country. More generally, p can include a 
percentage non-wage premium derived from superior research facilities, and the prevalence of meritocratic 
practices in hiring and promotion policies in the host country that may be lacking in the home country. To 
help the intuition, assume that the rich country is the U.S. There is a cost of movement, c, capturing any 
continuing cultural and personal cost caused by living abroad. 
The net utility levels of potential movers and stayers in the original country are given by a simple 
additive form: 
   Utility of a mover = (1 + p)q – c 
   Utility of a stayer = q. 
An individual will choose to move if 
   (1 + p)q – c  – q = pq – c  > 0, or q > c/p. 
The average productivity of migrants is 
   M = ∫c/p
1 qf(q)dq/∫c/p
1 f(q)dq.       (1) 
Assume that scientists in the host country are characterized by the same talent density function f(q). Then, 
the average productivity of stayers in the host country is 
   S = ∫q*
1 qf(q)dq/∫q*
1 f(q)dq.       (2) 
It can be shown that the difference in mean productivities, 
   M – S = D(c, p, q*),        (3) 
 is an increasing function of the mobility cost c, and a decreasing function of the premium p. 
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If the cost of mobility and the premium are both positive, c < p, and c is sufficiently large, then q* < 
c/p < 1, so that the difference D is positive and the quality of movers, on average, will exceed the quality of 
stayers. In other words, if it is very costly to leave one’s country and the premium is sufficiently high, only 
absolutely outstanding scientists will find it worth their while. Consequently, migrants would be positively 
selected relative to stayers in the host country. However, as c declines, the difference D approaches zero, 
and highly productive migrants and stayers come from approximately the same section of the underlying 
talent distribution, so that they will have similar observed productivity levels.  
The next extension is useful for our purposes. As q* increases, q* becomes closer to c/p, so that the 
difference D in expression 3 decreases. In other words, as the minimum quality threshold increases and we 
move from the set of highly productive scientists towards what we call the elite, elite migrants and stayers 
come from approximately the same section of the underlying talent distribution, so that they will have 
similar observed productivity levels.  
Note that the Hunter et al. (2009) model is a simplified version of the standard income-maximizing 
model on the selection of immigrants (Borjas, 1987, and Section 3 in Borjas, 1999) based on the seminal 
contribution by Roy (1951). However, the latter emphasizes the role of earnings inequality for the selection 
of migrants. If the correlation coefficient of the observed component of earnings across countries is 
sufficiently high, and the unobserved component of earnings in the host country exhibits greater (lower) 
inequality than in the home country, migrants will be positively (negatively) selected from the upper tail of 
the home country’s income distribution and will outperform the native born (will not perform well) in the 
host country. Differences in mean earnings at home and abroad, as well as migration costs, do affect 
migration probabilities but they have no effect on the direction of selection. In another application of the 
Roy model, Grogger and Hanson (2011) provide an integrated framework to examine the fraction of the 
population that emigrates, the selectivity of migrants in terms of schooling, and the sorting of migrants by 
schooling level across destinations. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of productivity distributions 
 
 
A. Productivity means 
 
   Productivity index     µ 1       µ 2     
   
    Q   307.3    707.3 
 
 Q’   187.4    419.5 
 
 P    27.0      59.2 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   
B. Skewness of productivity distributions 
      % of individuals in category:          % of total productivity accounted for by category: 
    1    2    3    1    2    3 
         
Q 67.1  21.4  11.5  24.2  32.2  43.6 
  
 Q’  66.7  21.2  12.1  25.4  31.3  43.3 
 
 P  67.0  22.0  11.0  27.7  32.8  39.5 
 
 Category 1 = individuals with productivity ≤ µ1   
Category 2 = individuals with productivity between µ1 and µ2 
Category 3 = individuals with productivity > µ2   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
     C. Elite sizes                                        
Q   833    
Q’   843    





Table 2. Explanatory variables. Descriptive statistics 
 
       
         A. DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES                  TOTAL SAMPLE                ELITE  
 
        Mean Age (Standard deviation)             18.8 (12.4)               27.2  (10.4) 
 
 Cohorts according to three definitions: 
1. % Younga     50.1%     28.7% 
2. % Youngb     45.8%     13.1% 
3. % Youngc     67.1%     43.9% 
 
      % Females      14.0%       5.4%  
            
     B. UNIVERSITY OF CURRENT JOB          Frequency    %          Frequency   % 
  
 1. Top 25 U.S.  depar tments    896  35.4  457 54.9 
 2. Last  27 U.S.  depar tments    674  26.6  182 21.8  
 3. OSC depar tments*    963*  38.0  194 23.3   
   Total               2,530              100.0  833       100.0 
      C. MOVERS  & STAYERS 
 
           Current job = U.S. 
 1. Brain c i r cu la t ion         8    0.3     5   0.6 
 2. Fore igners ,  Bra in dra in   644  25.5  234 28.1 
 3. Stayers      915  36.2  400 48.0 
  
        Current job = OSC 
 4. Brain c i r cu la t ion     181    7.1    49   5.9 
 5. Fore igners ,  bra in  dra in    371  14.7    57   6.8 
 6. Stayers*     411*  16.2    88 10.6 
   Total               2,530              100.0  833       100.0 
 
             D. UNIVERSITY OF B.A.   
 
 1. Top 10 U.S.      298  11.8  147 17.6 
 2. Next 15 U.S.      144    5.7    70   8.4 
 3. Next 27 U.S.      134    5.3    49   5.9 
 4. Other  U.S.      403  15.9  153 18.4 
 5. EUd*      949*  37.5  222 26.6 
 6. RWe      602  23.8  192 23.1 
   Total               2,530             100.0  833       100.0 
 
 E. UNIVERSITY OF Ph.D. 
 1. Harvard & MIT    352  13.9  178 21.4 
2. Other  Top 10 U.S.     749  29.6  273 32.8 
 3. Next 15 U.S.      416  16.4  133 16.0 
 4. Next 27 U.S.      181    7.2    58   7.0 
 5. Other  U.S.        51    2.1    11   1.3 
 6. EUd*      681*  26.9  147 17.6 
 7. RWe       100    3.9    33   3.9 
   Total               2,530             100.0  833       100.0 
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F. UNIVERSITY OF FIRST JOB 
  
 1. Top 10 U.S.      539     21.2  291 34.9 
 2. Next 15 U.S.      369  14.5  139 16.7 
 3. Next 27 U.S.      362  14.3    99 11.9 
 4. Other  U.S.      174    6.8    42   5.0 
 5. EUd*      682*  27.2  160 19.2 
 6. RWe      390  15.5  101 12.1 
 7. Miss ing        13    0.5    10   0.1 
   Total               2,530             100.0  833       100.0 
       
a  Young = Individuals with less than 20 years after earning a Ph.D. ∼ less than 50 years of age 
b  Young = Individuals with less than 15 years after earning a Ph.D. ∼ less than 45 years of age 
c  Young = Individuals with less than 24 years after earning a Ph.D. ∼ less than 54 years of age 
dEU stands for the 15 countries in the European Union before the 2004 accession 






Table 3. The role of demographic variables in the total sample 
 
       
Model 1:   Log Q = α0 + α1 Age + α2 Age
2 + α3 (Age x Young)+ α4 (Age
2 x Young)  + α5 Young + α6 Female +ε 
 
Age effects:  (α1 + α3) + 2(α2 + α4) Age,  if Young = 1 
 
   α1 + 2 α2 Age,  if Young = 0 
 
Cohort effects:  α3 Age + α4 Age
2 + α5,  if Young = 1 
 
Gender effect:  α6 
 
      Young  = 1 if: 
   
          Age  ≤  20        Age  ≤  15         Age  ≤  24 
 
Variables  Coeff.   t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
 
Age   0.1397    10.9  0.1557    13.2  - 0.0888    - 1.8 
 
Age2           - 0.0014    - 5.3             - 0.0016    - 6.4    0.0015      2.4 
 
Age x Young  0.2108      8.4  0.1655     10.0    0.4184      7.7 
 
Age2 x Young          - 0.0081    - 7.8              - 0.0062    - 8.5  - 0.0096    - 9.8 
 
Young           - 0.3771    - 2.8  0.0034     0.04  - 4.5674    - 2.8 
 
Female            - 0.5794    - 6.8             - 0.5819    - 6.9  - 0.5822    - 6.8 
 
Constant   2.6462    13.9  2.3502    13.9    6.873       7.4 
 
N   2,530   2,530     2,530 
 




Age effects when: 
Age  = 5  0.2557   0.2434   0.2487 
 
 Age  = 10 0.1609   0.1654   0.1678 
 
 Age  = 30 0.0764   0.0596   0.0047 
 
Cohort effects when: 
 Age  = 5  0.472   0.6763               - 2.7166 
 




Table 4. Exploratory models for the total sample, and final specification for the total sample and elite I (In all cases, 
productivity is measured according to the Q index, and the variable Young  is equal to one when Age  ≤20) 
 
 
Dependent variable: Log Q  
 
   MODEL 2    MODEL 3  FINAL SPECIFICATION 
I. KEY VARIABLES  T. SAMPLE   T. SAMPLE T. SAMPLE    ELITE  
 
    Coeff.  t-value   Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value 
CURRENT JOB = U.S.    C. JOB = U.S. 
1. Brain circulation           -  -  1. Brain circ. 1.0205 2.2* 1.1488 2.6* 0.7678 2.6* 
2. Foreigners               -0.2626   -0.7  2. Top 25, Frg. 0.9418 6.2*   
3. Stayers                -0.5536   -1.7        Young   1.4311 5.1* 0.3991 3.4* 
4. Top 25 departments  1.2604 3.2*        Old    1.1077 5.6* 0.4391 5.1*   
5. Last 27 departments  0.6254 1.7  3. Top 25, Stayers 0.7366 3.2*   
             Young   1.3196 4.2* 0.3498 2.0* 
CURRENT JOB = OSC            Old    0.7698 3.0* 0.2908 2.0* 
6. Brain circulation   0.2139 1.7 4. Last 27, Frg. 0.4370 3.1*    
7. Foreigners   0.2000 1.7        Young   0.9098 3.3* 0.2466 2.1* 
8. Stayers = Reference group                 Old    0.6499 3.1* 0.1457 2.0* 
       5. Last 27, Stayers 0.0168    0.1 
       Young   0.5225 1.7 0.2307 1.4  
        Old    0.1019 0.4 0.1236 0.8 
 
      CURRENT JOB = OSC 
       6. Brain circ. 0.2134 1.7 0.5914 2.7* 0.2447 2.7* 
       7. Foreigners 0.1995 1.7 
            Young   0.7261 3.0* 0.2316 2.0* 
            Old    0.2704 1.6 0.1230 1.8 
       8. Stayers            Reference group 
           Young    0.5734 2.4* 0.1221 1.1 
           Old                Reference group  
 
 
        MODEL 2   MODEL 3                FINAL SPECIFICATION 
II. CONTROL VARIABLES    T. SAMPLE  T. SAMPLE  T. SAMPLE    ELITE  
    Coeff.        t-value        Coeff. t-val                Coeff.  t-value      Coeff  t-value 
     A. Demographic variables 
1. Age              0.1626      15.2*  0.1628 15.3*  0.1624     15.2* 0.0403   2.7* 
2. Age2                 -0.0019       -8.7*               -0.0019  -8.8*              -0.0019  -8.7*     -0.0003     -1.4 
3. Young x Age   0.2242       10.6* 0.2230 10.6*  0.2220 10.6* 0.0111   0.4 
4. Young x Age2                    -0.0089      -10.4*             -0.0089   -10.4*              -0.0088   -10.4*     -0.0004     -0.3 
5. Young                             -0.3545        -3.1*             -0.3573  -3.1*              -0.7685     -3.5*     -0.1055     -0.7 
6. Female                             -0.5474        -7.3*             -0.5523  -7.3*              -0.5550     -7.3*     -0.1538     -3.3* 
 
     B. University of B.A. 
U.S. 
1. Top 10 U.S.              0.1476         0.9  0.1406   0.8  0.1444   0.9 0.0790    0.6 
2. Next 15 U.S.               0.0018         0.01             -0.0077  -0.04              -0.0013     -0.01 0.0286    0.2 
3. Next 27 U.S.               0.1326         0.7  0.1499   0.8  0.1530   0.9       -0.0283     -0.2 
4. Other U.S.   0.0484         0.4  0.0531   0.3  0.0573   0.3       -0.0503     -0.3 
 
Outside U.S. 
5. Reference group = EU       




     C. University of Ph.D.  
U.S. 
1. Harvard & MIT   0.2956       3.1*             0.2989   3.2*  0.2903   3.1*      0.0153   0.1 
2. Other Top 10 U.S.  0.0931       1.1                0.0958   1.1  0.0845   1.0       -0.2138    -2.6* 
3. Next 15 U.S.   0.1064       1.1              0.1097   1.1  0.1062   1.1       -0.1942    -2.2* 
4. Next 27 U.S.               -0.0795      -0.7               -0.0796  -0.7              -0.0924     -0.8       -0.2021    -1.96* 
5. Other U.S.               -0.1409      -0.8               -0.1320  -0.8              -0.1301     -0.8       -0.0045    -0.03 
 
Outside U.S. 
6. Reference group = EU 
7. RW    0.4472       3.6*              0.4406   3.5*  0.4548   3.5*       -0.0254    -0.3 
 
     D. University of first job  
U.S. 
1. Top 10 U.S.   0.2913          3.1              0.2956   3.2*  0.3074   3.1* 0.0919    1.4 
2. Next 15 U.S.               -0.0081         -0.1              -0.0082  -0.1  0.0076   0.1       -0.0099     -0.1 
3. Next 27 U.S.               -0.0634         -0.6              -0.0570  -0.6              -0.0391     -0.4       -0.0528     -0.6 
4. Other U.S.               -0.1394         -1.2              -0.1394  -1.2                     -0.1199    -1.0       -0.0467      -0.5 
 
Outside U.S. 
5. Reference group = EU + Missing 
6. RW                -0.1557        -1.6              -0.1573  -1.6                     -0.1573     -1.6       -0.0543     -0.8 
7. Missing               -1.5770           -3.4*             -1.5707     -3.4*                   -1.6219      -3.5*     -0.4257     -4.5* 
 
Constant   1.9024     10.2* Constant   1.8145     8.6* 5.459     22.7* 
 
 
N    2,530      2,530     2,530     833 






Table 5. Tests of hypothesis concerning productivity comparisons between foreigners and stayers. Final 
specification for the total sample and the elites (productivity measure = Q index, Young  = 1 if Age  ≤20) 
 
 
Hypothesis testing, results: Yes = foreigners are more productive than stayers 
        No = foreigners and stayers are equally productive 
        p-values in brackets 
        
                 Final specification 
   
        Model 3                                                                      Quantile regr. 
 Total sample    Total sample               Elite             95th percentile       
A. DEPT. CATEGORIES         (1)                        (2)              (3)          (4)             
 
1. Top 25 U.S. departments No (0.2766) 
 Young           No  (0.540)  No (0.721)   No (0.421)   
 Old           Yes (0.086)  No (0.263)    No (0.458)      
 
2. Last 27 U.S. departments Yes (0.0375) 
 Young           Yes (0.045)  No (0.908)   No (0.402)      
 Old           Yes (0.031)  No (0.869)   No (0.594)      
   
3. 29 OSC departments         No (t-value = 1.67) 
 Young           No (0.333)  No (0.250)   No (0.278)      
 Old                                       No (t-value = 1.65)       No (t-value = 1.80)   No (t-value = 0.31)     
     
 
 
B. DEPARTMENT CATEGORIES                          Total sample      Elite     
  
      U.S. DEPARTMENTS  
 
1. Top 10  
 Young      No (0.560)   No (0.975) 
 Old      Yes (0.042)   No (0.140) 
 
2. Next 15  
 Young      No (0.441)   No (0.396) 
 Old      No (0.110)   No (0.356) 
 
3. Last 27  
 Young      Yes (0.023)   No (0.704) 
 Old      Yes (0.017)   No (0.675) 
 
       OSC DEPARTMENTS 
 
4. Canada + UK departments 
 Young      No (0.141)   No (0.828) 
 Old      No (0.912)         Yes (0.066)      
 
5. Other OSC departments 
 Young      No (0.744)   Yes (0.058) 






Table 6. Descriptive statistics in the total sample. Movers & stayers for different cohort definitions 
 
            Young  = 1 if: 
   
         Age  ≤  15     Age  ≤  20         Age  ≤  24 
CURRENT JOB = U.S.               Freq.   %           Freq.   %   Freq.   % 
  1. Brain c i r cu la t ion     8  0.3       8   0.3         8   0.3 
       A. Top 25 U.S. 
 Fore igners   
     2. Young   228   9.0  268 10.6  305 12.1 
  3. Old    156   6.2  116    4.6    79   3.1 
 Stayers  
  4. Young   158   6.2  206   8.1  260 10.3 
  5. Old    346 13.7  298 11.8  244   9.6 
         B. Last 27 U.S. 
 Fore igners  
  6. Young   143   5.6  186   7.3  208   8.2 
  7. Old    117   4.6      74   2.9    52   2.0 
 Stayers  
  8. Young    99   3.9  135   5.4  171   6.8 
  9. Old    312 12.3  276 10.9  240   9.5 
         C. CURRENT JOB = OSC 
  10. Brain c i r cu la t ion   181   7.1  181   7.1  181   7.1 
 Fore igners  
  11. Young   255 10.1  299 11.8  315 12.5 
  12. Old    116   4.6      72   2.9    56   2.2 
 Stayers  
  13. Young   202   8.0  255 10.1  304 12.1 
  14. Old*    209*   8.3  156*   6.2  107*   4.2 
             Total            2,530         100.0                  2,530       100.0             2,530       100.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   
         Percentage distribution between young and old in each category 
 
       A. Top 25 U.S., Fore igners ,  Young   59.4   69.8   79.4  
                    Old   40.6   30.2     20.6 
 
      Stayers ,  Young   31.3   40.9    51.6  
                 Old    68.7   59.1    48.4 
 
       B. Last 27 U.S., Fore igners ,  Young   55.0     71.5   80.0  
                      Old   45.0     28.5   20.0 
 
       Stayers ,  Young   24.1   32.8   41.6  
        Old    75.9   67.2   58.4 
 
         C. 29 OSC, Brain c i r cu la t ion ,  Young     59.1   65.7   72.4 
              Old   40.9   34.3   27.6 
 
  Fore igners ,  Young   68.7   80.6   84.9 
                     Old    31.3       19.4     15.1 
 
  Stayers ,  Young    49.1    62.0    74.0 
            Old    50.9    38.0    26.0 
 
          Total sample, Young    45.8      50.1   67.1   
                Old     54.2        49.9     32.9  
53 
 
Table 7. Tests of hypothesis concerning productivity comparisons between foreigners and stayers for dfferent 
cohort definitions and productivity measures. Total sample and the elite I 
 
 
Hypothesis testing, results: Yes = foreigners are more productive than stayers 
        No = foreigners and stayers are equally productive 




          A. Cohort definitions (Q index) 
   
     Young  = 1 if Age  ≤15            Young  = 1 if Age  ≤24 
 
     Total sample  Elite I    Total sample   Elite I 
1. Top 25 U.S. departments  
 Young    No (0.625) No (0.948)  No (0.456) No (0.448) 
 Old    No (0.127) No (0.284)  Yes (0.016) No (0.456) 
 
2. Last 27 U.S. departments 
 Young    Yes (0.041) No (0.933)  Yes (0.027) No (0.960) 
 Old    Yes (0.056) No (0.896)  Yes (0.047) No (0.780) 
 
3. 29 OSC departments 
 Young    No (0.431) No (0.379)  No (0.147) No (0.263) 
 Old       Yes (t-value = 2.0)   Yes (t-value = 2.3)             No (t-value = 0.60) No (t-value = 1.84) 




  B. Productivity measures (Young  = 1 if Age  ≤20) 
   
             Q ’ index        P  index 
 
     Total sample   Elite I   Total sample    Elite I 
1. Top 25 U.S. departments 
 Young    No (0.591) No (0.513)  No (0.808) No (0.960) 
 Old    No (0.105) No (0.122)  No (0.244) No (0.400) 
 
2. Last 27 U.S. departments 
 Young    Yes (0.065) No (0.679)  No (0.509) No (0.324) 
 Old    Yes (0.034) No (0.677)  Yes (0.074) No (0.964) 
 
3. 29 OSC departments 
 Young    No (0.338) No (0.146)  No  (0.825) Yes (0.082) 
               Old                                           No (t-value = 1.63)  No (t-value = 1.51)          No (t-value = 0.37)   No (t-value = -0.78)                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
